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ФИО: Прокопеня Вероника Константиновна

Должность: Руководитель управления по образовательной деятельности

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**Пегосударственное образовательное учреждение высшего образования
«Школа управления СКОЛКОВО»**

Утверждено

Руководитель управления
по образовательной деятельности

В.К. Прокопеня
“30” июля 2026 г.

РАБОЧАЯ ПРОГРАММА ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ

Институциональная экономика / Institutional Economics

Москва
2026

Направление подготовки	38.03.02 Менеджмент
Квалификация выпускника	Бакалавр
Образовательная программа	Управление и предпринимательство 2025, 2026
Форма обучения	Очная

Трудоемкость		Контактная работа		Самостоятельная работа	Форма контроля
з.е.	часы	лекции	семинарские занятия		
3	108	24	24	60	Экзамен

1. АННОТАЦИЯ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ

This course provides a systematic introduction to the theory and methods of Institutional Economics. It explores how formal and informal institutions (rules, norms, conventions) shape economic behavior, structure incentives, and influence economic performance and development. The course covers core theories (including Transaction Cost Economics, Property Rights Theory, Public Choice, and New Institutional Economics) and applies them to analyze real-world issues such as contract design, corporate governance, state efficiency, and institutional change, with a particular focus on the context of emerging markets.

2. ПЛАНИРУЕМЫЕ РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ОСВОЕНИЯ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ

В случае успешного освоения курса студенты будут:

знать

- the fundamental concepts of institutions, transaction costs, property rights, and contracts;
- the core theoretical frameworks of different schools within institutional economics;
- the role of institutions in economic development, governance, and the functioning of markets and organizations.

уметь

- apply institutional analysis to diagnose economic problems and governance failures;
- analyze how specific institutional arrangements affect incentives and outcomes;
- critically evaluate institutional reforms and policies using theoretical tools.

владеть

- the skills of comparative institutional analysis;
- the ability to use basic game-theoretic concepts to model simple strategic interactions within given institutional constraints;
- the skill of preparing analytical briefs on institutional issues.

Дисциплина направлена на развитие следующих компетенций и их индикаторов:

Код компетенции	Формулировка компетенции и/или ее индикатора (ов)
ОПК-1.	Способен решать профессиональные задачи на основе знаний (на промежуточном уровне) экономической, организационной и управленческой теории

ОПК-1-1.	Знает основы математической, экономической, социальной и управленческой теории и использует знания для решения профессиональных задач
ОПК-1-2.	Формулирует профессиональные задачи, используя понятийный аппарат математической, экономической, социальной и управленческой наук
ОПК-1-3.	Применяет инструментарий экономико-математического моделирования для постановки и решения профессиональных задач выявления причинно-следственных связей и оптимизации деятельности объекта управления
ОПК-2.	Способен осуществлять сбор, обработку и анализ данных, необходимых для решения поставленных управленческих задач, с использованием современного инструментария и интеллектуальных информационно-аналитических систем
ОПК-2-1.	Определяет источники данных и выбирает методы и инструменты поиска, корректно осуществляет анализ литературы и документов
ОПК-2-2.	Применяет методы сбора, обработки и анализа данных, необходимых для решения управленческих задач, с использованием современных цифровых технологий, воспринимает, анализирует, запоминает и передает информацию с использованием цифровых средств, а также с помощью алгоритмов при работе с полученными из различных источников данными.

3. СОДЕРЖАНИЕ И СТРУКТУРА ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ

Название раздела/темы	Всего часов	Трудоемкость (час.) по видам учебных занятий			
		Контактная работа			Самостоятельная работа
		Всего	Лекции	Семинары	
Topic 1. Foundations of Institutional Economics	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 2. Transaction Cost Economics	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 3. Property Rights Theory	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 4. Contracts: Theory and Design	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 5. Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 6. The State and Public Choice Theory	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 7. Informal Institutions: norms, culture, trust	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 8. Institutions and economic development	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 9. Institutional change and path dependence	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 10. Corruption and rent-seeking	9	4	2	2	5
Topic 11. Regulation and business environment	9	4	2	2	5

Topic 12. Institutions in the digital age	9	4	2	2	5
Итого	108	48	24	24	60

Topic 1. Foundations of Institutional Economics

Definition of institutions. The role of institutions in reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. Old and New Institutional Economics. Basic methodological tools: game theory basics (dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium) for analyzing institutions.

Topic 2. Transaction Cost Economics

The concept of transaction costs (search, bargaining, enforcement). Oliver E. Williamson's framework: dimensions of transactions (frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity). Governance structures (market, hybrid, hierarchy) as efficient responses to transaction attributes. The "make-or-buy" decision.

Topic 3. Property Rights Theory

Property rights as a bundle of rights (usus, abusus, fructus). The Coase Theorem: its logic, assumptions, and implications for bargaining under zero transaction costs. The problem of externalities. The importance of clearly defined and enforceable property rights for investment and efficiency.

Topic 4. Contracts: Theory and Design

Complete and incomplete contracts. The principal-agent problem: sources and consequences (moral hazard, adverse selection). Mechanisms for contract enforcement and mitigating agency problems (incentive contracts, monitoring, bonding). Relational contracts.

Topic 5. Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance

The firm as a nexus of contracts. Why firms exist (Coasean and post-Coasean views). Boundaries of the firm. Agency problems between owners and managers, and between shareholders and debt holders. The role of the board of directors, executive compensation, and market for corporate control.

Topic 6. The State and Public Choice Theory

The state as an institution for defining property rights and enforcing contracts. The monopoly of violence. Theories of state behavior: benevolent social planner vs. predatory/rent-seeking state. Public Choice: the logic of collective action, rent-seeking, and regulatory capture.

Topic 7. Informal Institutions: norms, culture, trust

The role of social norms, conventions, and codes of conduct. The economics of trust and social capital. How informal institutions complement or substitute for formal rules. The impact of culture on economic outcomes.

Topic 8. Institutions and economic development

Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run economic growth. "Institutions rule" hypothesis. The role of inclusive and extractive institutions. Comparative analysis of developmental trajectories.

Topic 9. Institutional change and path dependence

Sources of institutional change: demand-driven, supply-driven. The role of relative prices, ideologies, and political power. The concept of path dependence. Windows of opportunity for reform.

Topic 10. Corruption and rent-seeking

Defining corruption. Economic models of corruption (principal-agent-client). Costs of corruption for economic development. Rent-seeking theory: resources wasted on unproductive competition for privileges. Anti-corruption strategies and their effectiveness.

Topic 11. Regulation and business environment

The economic rationale for regulation. Costs of poor regulation (red tape). Measuring the business environment (e.g., Doing Business indicators). Institutional prerequisites for a competitive market economy.

Topic 12. Institutions in the digital age

How digital technologies (blockchain, smart contracts, platforms) are changing transaction costs and the enforcement of property rights and contracts. New challenges for regulation, competition policy, and data ownership.

4. ОЦЕНОЧНЫЕ СРЕДСТВА И ПРИМЕРЫ ЗАДАНИЙ ДЛЯ ОЦЕНКИ РЕЗУЛЬТАТОВ ОСВОЕНИЯ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ

4.1 Текущий контроль

Оценка за курс складывается из следующих видов заданий текущего контроля, каждый из которых обладает своим весом в общей системе:

Компоненты	Процент в итоговой оценке
Individual problem sets	30%
Group case study project	40%
Midterm test	30%

Если по результатам текущего контроля студент получил положительную оценку (не ниже «удовлетворительно»), оценка за промежуточную аттестацию выставляется автоматически.

Individual problem sets

Two assignments with analytical exercises (applying transaction cost logic to a business case, analyzing a simple game-theoretic model of corruption, calculating rent-seeking costs).

Group case study project

A semester-long project (groups of 3-4). Analysis of a real-world institutional problem (corporate governance failure in a specific company, reform of a specific regulation, analysis of corruption in a sector). Deliverables: a written report (approximately 2000 words) and a presentation.

Midterm test

Covers Topics 1-6. Includes definitions, short-answer questions, and applied problems.

4.2 Промежуточная аттестация

Студентам, набравшим достаточные для удовлетворительной оценки баллы за текущий контроль, оценка за дисциплину выставляется равной оценке за текущий контроль (См. п. 4.1).

Студентам, получившим неудовлетворительную оценку по результатам текущего контроля, необходимо по согласованию с преподавателем сдать один или несколько компонентов текущего контроля. Преподаватель вправе предложить студентам выполнить задание, не повторяющее задание текущего контроля, но проверяющее аналогичные знания, умения и навыки.

4.3 Примеры заданий

Examples of test's assignments

1. According to Douglass North's definition, institutions are:
 - a) Organizations like firms, banks, and government agencies.
 - b) The humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.
 - c) The legal code and constitution of a country.
 - d) The established patterns of behavior in a society.
2. In Transaction Cost Economics (Oliver Williamson), the primary reason for a firm to integrate a production stage vertically (make rather than buy) is:
 - a) To achieve economies of scale.
 - b) To reduce production costs through superior technology.
 - c) To mitigate the hazards associated with high asset specificity and contractual incompleteness.
 - d) To increase market share and monopoly power.
3. The Coase Theorem suggests that, in the absence of transaction costs:

- a) Government intervention is always necessary to solve externalities.
 - b) The initial allocation of property rights does not affect the efficiency of the final outcome, as parties will bargain to an efficient solution.
 - c) Property rights should always be assigned to the party that values them the most.
 - d) Private bargaining will never lead to a socially optimal outcome.
4. The "principal-agent problem" arises primarily because of:
- a) Incomplete contracts and asymmetric information.
 - b) A lack of formal institutions.
 - c) Perfectly competitive markets.
 - d) Identical goals between the principal and the agent.
5. Path dependence in institutional analysis refers to:
- a) The idea that future institutional choices are completely independent of past events.
 - b) The process where past choices and historical events create increasing returns to a specific institutional arrangement, making change difficult.
 - c) The deterministic view that a country's institutions are solely defined by its geography.
 - d) The optimal path for institutional reform prescribed by international organizations.
6. According to Public Choice theory, "rent-seeking" is best defined as:
- a) The legitimate profit earned by entrepreneurs in a competitive market.
 - b) The act of seeking to increase one's share of existing wealth without creating new wealth, often by influencing government policy.
 - c) The payment made to rent a capital asset like machinery or a building.
 - d) The process of competing for market share through innovation.
7. The key difference between "formal" and "informal" institutions is that:
- a) Formal institutions are always more efficient than informal ones.
 - b) Formal institutions are consciously designed and enforced by the state, while informal institutions are socially shared rules.
 - c) Informal institutions only exist in traditional societies.
 - d) Formal institutions govern economic life, while informal institutions govern social life.
8. In a game theory context, a "Nash Equilibrium" is a set of strategies where:
- a) All players achieve their highest possible payoff.
 - b) No player can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies chosen by others.
 - c) The outcome is always socially optimal.
 - d) Players cooperate to achieve a collective good.
9. A key argument of the "institutions rule" hypothesis in development economics is that:
- a) Geographic factors are the primary determinant of long-term growth.
 - b) Cultural traits are immutable and solely determine economic outcomes.
 - c) The quality of a country's institutions is a fundamental cause of its economic performance.
 - d) Foreign aid is the most effective tool for spurring development.
10. The main economic problem that "common-pool resources" (like fisheries or grazing lands) face in the absence of defined rules is:
- a) Monopoly pricing.
 - b) The tragedy of the commons, resulting from overuse and depletion.
 - c) A lack of technological innovation.
 - d) Excessive government regulation.
11. Define the terms "institution," "formal institution," and "informal institution." Provide one concrete example for each and explain how your examples fulfill the core function of institutions in an economic system.
12. State the Coase Theorem. A factory's pollution damages the crop yield of a nearby farm. According to the theorem, what is the efficient outcome regarding pollution levels if bargaining is costless? How does the introduction of high transaction costs (costly litigation, many affected parties) change the practical relevance of the initial assignment of pollution rights?

13. Identify the principal(s) and the agent(s) in the classic corporate governance conflict between shareholders and top management. Name one specific moral hazard problem and one specific adverse selection problem that can arise in this relationship.
14. According to Ronald Coase's work, why do firms exist? What is the key economic mechanism that determines the boundary between a firm and the market? Explain briefly.
15. Describe a situation where an informal institution can effectively substitute for a weak formal institution. Then, describe a situation where an informal institution can hinder the functioning of a formal institution.
16. Two competing firms are deciding whether to adopt a common industry technical standard (cooperate) or push their own proprietary standard (defect). The payoff matrix (in millions of USD) is below. Identify the Nash Equilibrium (or equilibria) of this one-shot game. Is the outcome Pareto efficient? Explain.

	Firm B: Cooperate	Firm B: Defect
Firm A: Cooperate	(5, 5)	(0, 8)
Firm A: Defect	(8, 0)	(2, 2)

5. УЧЕБНО-МЕТОДИЧЕСКОЕ И ИНФОРМАЦИОННОЕ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЕ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ

5.1 Литература

1. Одинцова, М. И. Институциональная экономика : учебник для академического бакалавриата / М. И. Одинцова. — 4-е изд., перераб. и доп. — Москва : Издательство Юрайт, 2025.
2. Корнейчук, Б. В. Институциональная экономика : учебник для вузов / Б. В. Корнейчук. — 2-е изд., испр. и доп. — Москва : Издательство Юрайт, 2025.
3. Сухарев, О. С. Институциональная экономика : учебник и практикум для вузов / О. С. Сухарев. — 3-е изд., испр. и доп. — Москва : Издательство Юрайт, 2025.

5.2 Электронные образовательные ресурсы

Материалы дисциплины размещены в LMS: <https://l.skolkovo.ru/login/index.php>.

6. ЛИЦЕНЗИОННОЕ И СВОБОДНО РАСПРОСТРАНЯЕМОЕ ПРОГРАММНОЕ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЕ

Операционная система Simple Linux, браузер Yandex браузер, антивирусное ПО Calmantisvirus.

Свободно распространяемое ПО, в том числе отечественного производства:

Офисный пакет Libre Office, Okular PDF Reader, 7-Zip Архиватор, GIMP Редактирования фотографий, Inkscape Векторная графика, Blender 3D графика, Kdenlive Видеоредактор, Audacity Аудиоредактор, VLC Медиаплеер, Thunderbird Почтовый клиент, Flameshot Создание скриншотов.

7. МАТЕРИАЛЬНО-ТЕХНИЧЕСКОЕ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЕ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ

Учебная аудитория для проведения занятий лекционного типа, оснащенная мультимедийным оборудованием, учебной мебелью, доской или со стенами с маркерным покрытием.

Учебная аудитория для проведения занятий семинарского типа, оснащенная мультимедийным оборудованием, учебной мебелью, доской или со стенами с маркерным покрытием.

Аудитория (коворкинг) для самостоятельной работы, оснащенная учебной мебелью, ноутбуками.

Материально-техническое обеспечение аудиторий представлено на официальном сайте <https://bbask.ru/sveden/objects/>.